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In recent years, Japan has attracted nearly as much international attention for its pension
crisis as the nation once did for achieving record levels of high growth. This latest attention,
however, is not eliciting emulation or envy from other nations, but rather it is highlighting a
situation to be avoided. Indeed, it is a scenario that is – or will be – playing out in other developed
nations, but it plagues Japan more critically. The pay-as-you- go (PAYG) nature of Japan’s
pension system is not particularly unique in a global context, but the speed with which the
country’s contribution base is shrinking, relative to current and future retirees, is unusual. In the
face of such rapidly changing demographics, employers worry about their ability to pay the
pensions of retirees through defined benefit schemes.
The Japan case represents a nearly unparalleled cause for concern due to the intersection of
three demographic trends: a birth rate in sharp decline, a baby boom generation approaching
retirement, and steady longevity increases during the postwar era. The subsequent disequilibrium
between contribution inflows and benefit outflows creates stress on the system and necessitates
increased pension expenditures, the slashing of future benefits, or some combination thereof.
Either way, an intergenerational gap or disparity between lifetime contributions and benefits
emerges. As these developments unfold in Japan, it is becoming clear that the piecemeal approach
followed initially by the country has created a growing sense of unease regarding the system’s
solvency.
In 2001, legislation permitting defined contribution (DC) pension plans in Japan appeared
to create an opportunity to disaggregate demographic s from corporate retirement benefits, while
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expanding private sector participation in the country’s equity markets. Lauded as the final step of
the deregulation of the Japanese financial system, expectations soared in the global investment
community. Foreign firms quickly set up shop in Japan, hoping to secure a foothold in the new
market and unlock the vast savings of the Japanese citizens. Cerulli (1999) reported industry
estimates of DC plan growth at between ¥8 trillion and ¥15 trillion within five years.
The introduction of new accounting standards for retirement benefits in 2000 were another
reason for optimism. For the first time, the projected benefit obligations (PBO) of corporate
pensions would be recorded on the balance sheet as a liability, making the funding status of a
firm’s pension system more transparent to investors, employees, and other stakeholders. To
manage this exposure, Japanese firms were expected to seek ways to cap liabilities for pension
benefits and severance pay. DC plans could provide one such outlet.
Nevertheless, these developments were not met with the warm reception initially
anticipated. Some 70 DC plans were established in the first year, but only 538 had been
established as of late 2003. This pales in comparison to the total number of private defined benefit
(DB) pension plans, which prior to the legislation, had totaled around 80,000 plans (Nikko
Financial Intelligence 2003). 1 To understand this less than enthusiastic takeup of DC plans in
Japan, I first analyze corporate behavior against the limitations of the law. Next I evalua te the
political process surround ing the DC legislation, where I argue that this process ultimately shaped
the lackluster acceptance of DC plans. I conclude by contemplating the future debate on Japanese
pensions and offer some perspectives on policy outcomes and the role for Japanese political
leadership in this process.
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History Provides Guidance
“As far back as the Edo period, employers have issued retirement
allowances as a way of saying ‘otsukaresama deshita’ (thank you for your
hard work).” Kiyoaki Fujiwara (2003), Keidanren
A history of corporate pensions in Japan usually starts with the first formal legislated
corporate pension plan, introduced in 1968. Yet Fujiwara (2003) recounts how the issuance of
retirement allowances under a notion of ‘otsukaresama deshita’ (thank you for your hard work)
dates back to the Edo period (1603-1867), which established a tradition of severance or lump-sum
retirement allowances in Japan. As Usuki (2003) explained:
Severance payments began to spread between 1910 and 1920… During the
economic boom around 1920 (during the Taisho Era), such payments were used as
a tool to induce workers to stay with their employers, but during the recessionary
period in the latter half of the 1920s they were more often used as compensation for
forced termination benefits.
A shortage of labor during WWII and the establishment of a public pension with the Workers’
Pension Insurance plan (1942) and its successor, the Employee Pension Insurance plan (EPI; 1944),
effectively eliminated the need for separate retirement benefits provided by the employer.
During the post-WW II period, inflationary pressures reduced the adequacy of the benefits
paid under the EPI, prompting many firms to introduce their own retirement programs. The
Minister of Health, Labor, and Welfare (MoHLW) found that 97 percent of businesses with 500+
employees, and 60-70 percent of other businesses, had rules for severance payment plans by 1956
(Usuki 2003). As severance payments became a general practice, an increasing number of large
companies began to use externally accumulated assets for funding rather than holding only book
reserves for pension benefits. To encourage or perhaps accommodate this behavior, Tax Qualified
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Pension Plans (TQPPs) were introduced in 1962 and they recognized contributions as expenses for
tax purposes.
By 1965, a growing awareness of the inadequacy of public pension benefits to maintain a
standard of living commensurate with the economic prosperity of the high-growth era led to a
significant increase in the level of the EPI (Usuki 2003). Coupled with this benefit increase,
though, came an increase in social security taxes for employers, and a growing disparity between
the TQPPs and the lump-sum severance allowances and the EPI. Management cried for relief from
the double burden of the latter. The government responded with the creation of the Employee
Pension Fund (EPF) in 1966, which granted companies the rights to administer and invest the
income-related portion of the EPI (transferred from the government to the company and referred to
as “contract-out”). With this piece of legislation, Japan’s pension system of co- mingled public and
private benefits was born.
Figure 1 here
Whether intended or not, the announcement of new accounting standards for retirement
benefits in fiscal 2000 forced at least the accounting recognition to be in line with the concept of
retirement benefits as deferred wages. With net present values of future retirement liabilities
recorded on corporate balance sheets, Japanese corporate actors began to view their corporate
pensions strategically, especially as these liabilities proved capable of impacting their balance
sheets so profoundly.

Demographic Challenges
The societal phenomenon of korei (aging) coupled with shoshi (few children) has created
an experience unique to Japan among nations. An aged population structure is “the result of a
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complex interaction between mortality and fertility over time” (Hiromitsu 2000: 230). Public
health and medical technology in the post-World War II era led to dramatic drops in infant
mortality as well as mortality rates for other age groups. In addition, Japan sports the highest life
expectancy for both males and females in the world 2 (World Health Organization 2001). When a
population is aging, though, fertility is equally as important as mortality since fewer new babies
translates into a greater proportion of elderly people in the total population. Japan’s fertility rate,
or the average number of children that a woman has during her lifetime, has been in constant
decline since 1950. From 3.65 in 1950 to 2.13 in 1970 (Hiromitsu 2000: 231), the fertility rate
dropped further to 1.29 in 2003 (Yoshida 2004).
Japan’s working population, after five decades of steady growth, has begun to decline and
will continue to do so as the postwar baby boomers begin to reach retirement age. The population
as a whole is on track to shrink nearly 20 percent by 2050, after reaching its expected peak in 2005
(Japan Times 2003, 25 October). As the number of older people relative to younger people
increases, there are more pension beneficiaries per working individual. The “dependency ratio”, or
the ratio of working age population (age 15-64) to pensioners in Japan has changed dramatically
over the years, and it is expected to drop from 4:1 in 2001 to just 2:1 in 2025 (Schoppa 2001). In
contrast, the U.S. is expected to have 3.25 working-age adults for every retiree in 2025. Pensions
and medical expenses could push the share of government and social- insurance spending in the
Japanese economy to more than 60 percent by 2025 (Schoppa 2001). Uncertainty about how Japan
will finance this burden is putting strain on the government’s bond ratings. In May 2002, Moody’s
classified Japan’s credit rating beneath that of Botswana; one month before, Standard & Poors
downgraded Japanese government bonds to AA-.
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Japan’s public pension system is predominantly PAYG, although past surpluses do provide
an extra cushion of funding. This cushion has grown thin with the Employees’ Pension System
posting its first deficit in 2001 (Cabinet Office 2003). Kunji Okue, an economist at Dresdner
Kleinwort Wasserstein, estimates that the public pension investment fund will run cumulative
deficits worth 27 trillion yen3 over the next five years and describes the national pension plan as
the current Prime Minister (Junichiro Koizumi)’s ‘time bomb’ (Belson 2003).

Other Strains on Japan’s Pension System
The demographic strain on the Japanese system has been exacerbated by the rising number
of self-employed workers who simply do not pay their pension premiums. Unlike salaried workers
whose premiums are automatically deducted from their pay, roughly 18 million self-employed
people and students age 20+ are required to pay their premiums directly to the government for the
basic portion of the national pension program. In fiscal 2002, those who failed to pay their
contribution premiums to the national pension program reached a record high of 37.2 percent, or
nearly four in ten (Japan Times 2003, October 27). In a recent controversy, top government
officials including the prime minister were revealed to be in arrears with their pension
contributions (Washington Post 2004).
Further, public skepticism over the national public system is growing. According to a 2003
Yomiuri Shimbun survey, 57 percent of the public said they had no faith in the system (Daily
Yomiuri 2003). This is the highest figure recorded in the seven-year history of the survey, up 3.7
percentage points from the previous survey. Moreover, the same article indicated that, among
respondents in their 20s, the lack of confidence in the system was a staggering 82 percent who said
they did not trust the scheme.
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Seeking to bolster the current system, the government has stated that it will increase its
share of public pension funding from one-third to one-half by fiscal 2009. The additional burden is
expected to cost the government an additional 2.7 trillion yen per year, but the source of that
funding is as yet unclear. (Japan Times 2003, December 18).
It is interesting that the office directly responsible for the management of social security
programs, the MoHLW, has being singled out as the worst offender of mismanaged funds among
the 12 government ministries and 18 state- funded corporations in Japan (Japan Times 2003,
December 8). This marks the 14th consecutive year that the MoHLW 4 has received this relegation
from the Board of Audit, an independent commission that works outside the jurisdiction of the
Cabinet. For 2002, the Board estimated that the MoHLW had mismanaged some 12 billion yen.
How that amount was mismanaged was not entirely clear, but it raises doubts over the Ministry’s
credibility and lends support to the belief that the MoHLW suffers from reduced bargaining power
in inter-ministerial discussions, especially concerning its handling of the ailing pension system.
Other structural problems also plague the system. A growing burden-benefit disparity is
creating a rift between the young and elderly. Those born in 1950 currently anticipate receiving
benefits worth five times their lifetime contributions (Amyx 2002), but the Japanese government
forecasts that those now age 20-40 ultimately will pay more into the system than they will ever
receive in benefits (Japan Times 2003, October 25). This generational inequity is also discussed
by Hatta and Oguchi (1999) who show that, for those born before 1970, lifetime benefits from the
National Pension System exceed lifetime contributions, but for those born after 1970, lifetime
benefits will fall short of lifetime contributions. Horioka (1999) notes at least two reasons for this:
At the time of the 1973 pension reform, benefits were generous relative to contributions, especially
for those close to retirement. This necessitated cuts to the benefits of younger cohorts, as well as
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increases in their contribution rates. Second, although the aging of the Japanese population is a
long-term phenomenon caused by rising life expectancy and falling birth rates, there is also a bulge
in the need for larger contributions from the younger working cohorts to finance the benefits of the
unusually large baby boom cohort.

Managing an Underfunded Plan
On the corporate front, pension underfunding is drawing attention as an area of
fundamental concern for companies. A 2003 report showed that pension fund assets at 100 of
Japan's largest companies covered less than half the cost of payments due to retirees (Jopson
2003). This figure is particularly striking because pension deficits were substantially reduced
by the 2003 rally in Japanese stocks. The costs of managing pension deficits present an
additional problem expected to persist over the next decade, and the evidence suggests that DB
plans represent a continuing underlying structural weakness plaguing many Japanese
companies.
The Lost Decade: Recession Japan. The Japanese economy has experienced a long and
painful recession for over a decade. Amyx (2003) comments, “The contrast between Japan’s
rise as an economic juggernaut and the stagnation that has typified economic performance
since the bursting of the asset bubble in 1991 is stark.” In macroeconomic terms, Japan’s lost
decade dissipated a substantial portion of the national wealth created in the previous four
decades. Unfortunately, this lost wealth would have helped finance the sizable pension
benefits promised to retired workers in the 21st century.
As Northern Trust’s Ted Krum (personal discussions, 2003) explains, a prolonged bear
market has had unfortunate consequences:
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It is difficult for outsiders to appreciate the psychological impact this will have on
an entire generation of workers and investors. …the pain and fear of loss are more
intense than the enjoyment of success. Investors who have lost a great deal of
money will work hard to reduce risk, making it a higher priority than return. They
will even take small, certain losses to avoid the possibility of larger losses later
on… They focus on the near-term risk of financial ruin, but cease to work toward
the long-term accomplishment of their goals.
Seeking to propel the economy from its slump, the Japanese government introduced in
1996 the “Big Bang,” a policy package initiating massive deregulation and liberalization of the
nation’s financial sector. In the years that followed, one fiscal stimulus package followed another,
and fiscal debt rose to over ¥666 trillion ($5.6 trillion) or 130 percent of GDP (Schoppa 2001).
Dissipating Saving. With the public pension system hanging in the balance, one might expect
personal saving to emerge as the primary form of income for many Japanese retirees. Yet,
there are signs that the Japan of high-savers is slowly dissipating. Figure 2 shows how Japan’s
saving rate fell below the levels recorded in France and Germany in 2001, and it has been
trending towards the U.S since then.
Figure 2 here
According to flow-of- funds numbers published by the Bank of Japan, money put into
saving or stock investments by households between 2002 and 2003 fell about ¥1.3 trillion short of
the combined amount of borrowings and saving in the same period (Yomiuri Shimbun 2003). The
household saving rate, or the amount of money each household puts into its saving from its aftertax income, dropped from 11.1 percent in 1999 to 9.8 percent in 2000, and to 6.9 percent in 2001,
according to the “System of National Accounts”(Cabinet Office 2003). Changing demographics
are certainly a key driver of this trend. The Cabinet Office (2003) reported that the percentage of
households consisting of non-employed elderly people expanded from 13.8 percent in 1995 to 22
percent in 2002, and their saving rate (i.e., the ratio of saving against income) fell from -11.5
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percent to -26 percent. In other words, a growing proportion of Japanese households had a
negative saving rate that became increasingly negative as saving was drawn down to cover income
shortfalls. As Figure 3 indicates, the number of elderly households in Japan is rising in concert
with the declining saving rate.
Figure 3 here
Given the instability of the public pension system, rising life expectancy, and the impact of
a declining national saving rate and aging population on economic growth, corporate pension plans
assume new importance in Japan. Indeed, the 2001 passage of the Defined Contribution Act and
the subsequent 2002 Defined Benefit Occupational Pension Act increased plan choice for Japanese
employers. These laws, however, need to be viewed within the broader context of “Big Bang”
deregulation of the Japanese financial markets.
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Japan’s Not-So Big Bang. In the aftermath of high-profile collapses at Sanyo Securities,
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, and Yamaichi Securities in 1997, Japan’s long-held resistance to
deregulation and changes in securities and tax laws seemed to dissipate. During the next two years,
the country began implementing kisei kanwa (deregulation or ‘rule relaxation’), which resulted in
the abolishment of the 5-3-3-2 regulation5 and the rules regarding investment allowed through
investment advisory companies. In 1998, the Japanese Government announced a Financial System
Reform Law, which amended 22 banking, investment trust, and securities laws. Regulations on
pension fund management eased in accordance with the Big Bang and the internationalization of
the global financial markets. The wave of deregulation paved the way for foreign firms to sell their
products through new distribution channels in Japan. With 51 percent of the U.S. population and
only six percent of the assets in its mutual fund industry, Japan and its Big Bang seemed like a “big
break” to foreign investment firms (Business Wire 1999).
Under the changing economic reality of the Big Bang, Japanese companies grew desperate
to find a way to reduce costs and an ever-expanding wage bill (only heightened by the aging
workforce), but they lacked a mechanism to resolve their unwieldy pension plans. From his
experience at Nippon Steel, Former Chairman Imai of the Japan Federation of Economic
Organizations (Keidanren) lamented, “Out of all the various cost-cutting measures available to
management, benefit costs, including the premiums for the social security and the national health
care, are the one aspect out of the company’s control.”6 Indeed, an annual survey compiled by the
Keidanren (2001) showed that from 1970 to 1995, mandated benefit costs had grown from 5.8
percent of cash compensation to 11.6 percent, while non-mandatory benefits had held steady at the
five percent level during this same period. Japanese corporate actors pressured Tokyo and lobbied
the politicians for a way out.
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During this period, Japanese companies were struggling to make themselves more
competitive in an increasingly global economy. Traditional Employer Pension Funds (EPFs)
suffered from poor financial conditions in the deteriorating investment environment following the
collapse of the bubble economy. As Figure 4 illustrates, the number of terminated EPFs rose
steadily from 1995, and the failure rate became noticeably higher in 1999. Fuji Film was one
company choosing dissolution. Fuji’s Vice President Imai described how a rapidly changing
operating environment led his company to contemplate this plan of action (Nikkei Business 2003).
Falling discount rates amplified the level of underfunding and liabilities linked to the Company’s
pension benefit obligations (PBOs), and this subsequently increased amortization expense related
to underfunding. Needing to focus on its core business and eliminate risk in its non-core business,
Fuji identified its pension plan as a prime target for cuts.
Figure 4 here
Pension dissolution in Japan is seen as a harsh measure with major consequence for
employees. However, as Fuji’s Imai explained, the short-term impact of pension-related expense
would eventually flow out of employees’ wages as increased total compensation cost (ibid). The
decision toward termination might be considered a sign of unavoidable change in Japan. Others
may conclude that it revealed a growing desperation among Japanese management teams to
relinquish a defined benefit promise to their employees. The next section takes up this issue by
looking at the role of paternalism in DC non-proliferation.

DC Non-Proliferation
The lukewarm response to DC plans in Japan has suggested to some Western observers that
Japanese companies are somehow “different” and subject to much stronger paternalistic motives
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than their Western counterparts. For instance Cerulli (2003:44) remarked, “In a country that
reveres ancestors, few look forward to telling their employees that they will have to provide for
their own retirement, which has made defined contribution plans unpopular if necessary.” That
study also concluded that “DC plans remain the biggest mirage in the Japanese asset management
industry.”
Until 1996, accumulated assets of EPFs were evaluated at book or historical values. In the
presence of low returns, current market values were not reflected on the balance sheet and only
latent losses accumulated, which failed to call adequate attention to asset management performance.
The Employees’ Pension Fund Association (PFA) reported positive returns until fiscal year 2000
when its returns turned negative at -10 percent for the year, followed by -4.1 percent in fiscal 2001,
and further deteriorating to -12 percent in fiscal 2002 (Nikkei Business 2003).
Daiko Henjo (Government Putback). As of early 2004, 728 EPFs, or 42 percent of the total EPF
universe received approval from the MoHLW to return, or “put back”, the state portion of their
pension funds to the government (Nikko Financial Intelligence, 2004). In this putback process (i.e.,
daiko henjo), EPFs return to the government assets equivalent to the minimum liability reserve,
accumulated from pension contributions and any investment gains that were retained by the
company in lieu of paying the state. For many companies, the assets corresponding to the daiko
henjo-related PBOs exceed the actual assets they are required to turn in, which creates a one-time
gain. The longer- lasting gain, though, is in the permanent removal of the underlying risk and
liability, and the ability to decrease future company obligations. Furthermore, since the put-back
does not curtail employees’ benefits, companies can complete this transfer without encountering
resistance from employees.
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As Daiwa’s Kashiwazaki (2003) wrote, “Broadly speaking, there is no reason for
companies not to carry out daiko henjo, and for many large companies with large pension benefit
obligations in particular, it seems rational to return assets [to the government] immediately. ”
Kashiwazaki (ibid) estimated that the value of assets to be returned to the state would ultimately
reach over 15 trillion yen. The corresponding number of funds would be in the neighborhood of
800 to 950 EPFs. For a Japanese company, the government-related portion typically comprises 30
to 50 percent of total PBOs. The ability to reduce this extent of the pension-related liabilities
translates into a huge win for the company, especially as new accounting standards force
companies to move PBOs onto their balance sheets.
Olympus began its daiko henjo in the fall of 2003. Thanks to this measure, the Company
decreased its PBO level by 21 billion yen and posted a one-time profit of four billion yen (Nikkei
Business 2003). According to Morgan Stanley’s Japanese Equity Strategist, Naoki Kamiyama
(2003), this strategy was a “no-brainer” for most large companies since their EPFs were either
single-sponsor (tandoku-gata) or group (rengo-gata), that is, consisting of related companies only.
For smaller companies organized into an industry EPF (sogo-gata), daiko henjo might be more
difficult to implement since it would require coordination and cooperation with the other
participating companies. In addition, the sogo EPFs typically do not offer benefits much above the
government portion, so daiko henjo would more than likely mean dissolution of the company’s
entire pension plan.
The reaction of Japanese companies to daiko henjo provides further evidence that
paternalism was not driving pension reform. As EPF dissolution and pension benefit reduction
continue, Japanese companies have not been resisting corporate pension reform, but in fact driving
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it. The next section reveals how the unique form of DC plans in Japan became the primary
stumbling block for companies.
Structural Flaws. Under Japan’s DC law, the maximum annual DC contribution limit is
¥432,000 (approximately $4,000) per employee for companies that lack alternative pension
systems, and ¥216,000 (approximately $2,000) 7 for those that have them. The DC legislation
restricts early withdrawals from employees before they reach the age of 60, prohibits employee
contributions, and may re- impose a capital gains tax of around one percent on contributions 8 .
In contrast, the U.S. 401(k) defined-contribution system is based on employee contributions
that can be matched by the employer, and it permits a generous maximum annual contribution
limit of $12,000 per person (2003) that will be raised incrementally to $15,000 over the next
several years.
When asked if contribution limits matter, IBM’s Tsubota responded: “Absolutely. If
allowed, we would seek to further reduce the volatility of the right-hand side of our balance sheet
by converting more of our current pension into a DC plan.”9 While IBM struggled to revise its
pension system while awaiting the final version of the law, Skylark (a Japanese company that
operates family restaurants) sought to make DC central to its pension system no matter what the
legal contribution limits turned out to be. Post-legislation, most (roughly 88 percent) of Skylark’s
DC plan exceeded the 216,000 yen contribution limits (Imafuku 2002). The excess benefit then
became characterized as “prepaid” cash and is disqualified from any tax advantages. The approach
taken by Skylark, however, diverges from pension systems at most companies, which have
designed their systems to stay below the tax contribution ceilings.
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Union Threat: Fact or fiction? Several countries in Western Europe, including Italy, France,
and Germany, have proposed or implemented cutbacks to their state pension programs in
recent years. For these countries, pension reform is one of the most explosive domestic issues,
and citizen unrest results from the prospect of “diminished entitlements” (Bruni 2003). In Italy,
union- led strikes have paralyzed the nation after a proposal to raise the country’s retirement
age. In France, the government’s campaign to push through pension reform set off a series of
strikes, which disrupted schools and hospitals, halted newspaper and mail delivery, and
temporarily shut down the nation’s transit system (Sciolino 2003).
Observers wonder why Japanese unions (and indeed, Japanese citizens) have not been
more vocal in the face of pension reform. Indeed, large Japanese firms have long been viewed as
providers of social welfare benefits, similar to their counterparts in Europe. Although cooperation
rather than contention has characterized postwar labor-management relations in Japan historically,
union opposition toward DC legislation allegedly prompted the government to impose low
contribution limits. Japan’s largest union group, Rengo (the Japanese Trade Union Confederation)
argued its concern and cited the possibility of union strife as an impediment to DC proliferation
(NPO Institute 2003). Despite this, few stories emerged of union uprisings in Japan, even at times
of significant change in both public and private pension schemes.
An explanation may be found in the contribution limits themselves. Due to the scanty size
of permitted tax-exempt contributions, few companies have converted their entire pension plan into
a DC one. Those who have, were predominantly small-to- medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and
companies without pre-existing plans.
IBM Japan, as a predominantly non-union company, was required to gain approval from
two-thirds of its tens of thousands of employees to affect pension change. Thanks to effective HR
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communication, IBM Japan successfully built consensus and received an overwhelming 90 percent
support from its employees (Tsubota 2003). One might argue that the low limits of the DC
legislation actually helped IBM Japan gain support for its new pension plan. Had the DC
legislation allowed 100 percent conversion of IBM’s preexisting plan, would its employees have
signed on? Of course, no one knows the answer to this, but in some ways, the low level of the DC
limits may have helped large companies structure a two- or three-tier system (combining DC and
DB features) without encountering resistance from unions or employees.

HR Reform in Recessionary Japan
After the bubble burst in 1990, Japanese employers reviewed and revised their
compensation systems to cope with the prolonged recession and remain competitive in foreign
markets. Over time, the institution of seniority pay gave way to a new wage structure demanding
“pay for performance”. Many Japanese companies also began introducing a pay- for-performance
component to their traditional severance pay or DB pension plans through a “point system” that
tied pension benefit levels to evaluations of employees’ performance.
Prior to its pension plan reform, IBM Japan had moved to a merit-based wage system. So
reform this time dealt exclusively with pension benefits (Tsubota 2003). While its preliminary
pension plan reform was a collaborative effort with IBM Headquarters, practical and later-stage
decisions were made in Tokyo. Partially, this is attributable to the unique aspect of dealing with
the Japanese government and the uncertainty of the ultimate pension reform legislature. Since
Japan’s pension plan offerings differ from those in the U.S. and other countries, Tsubota (2003)
described how, as an “early adopter” of these plans, IBM Japan had to move slowly to compensate
for the ambiguity associated with the timing and eventual form of the legislature. From his point
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of view, many Japanese companies continue to take a wait-and-see approach. In IBM’s context,
pension reform represented the final step of a transition from a lifetime employment concept to
pay-for-performance. As Tsubota noted in 2003:“Corporate pensions represent just one part of an
overall HR Strategy. ”
Like IBM, Hitachi took measures prior to the implementation of a DC plan to convert its
compensation scheme to a merit-based one. In fiscal 2000, the Company applied a point system to
calculate its employees’ retirement allowances and pension benefits (Maruta 2003). The points
granted to each employee reflected that employee’s individual contribution and performance. In
this sense, the introduction of a DC plan was the final step in that initiative. However, Hitachi also
saw the “signaling” benefit of a DC plan in attracting, developing, and rewarding employees who
showed self- initiative and an active interest in planning for their post-retirement lives. Hitachi also
noted the social value of encouraging its employees to take a more active role in achieving their
post-retirement goals and financial objectives. Hitachi’s DC plan replaced one-half of its preexisting lump-sum retirement allowance or 20 percent of the Company’s total pension scheme.
Hitachi’s Hiroshi Maruta (2003) was quick to point out that, like Tsubota of IBM, he would have
opted for greater contributions had the government granted higher tax-advantaged contribution
ceilings.
For Japanese companies like IBM and Hitachi, taking the DC plunge was not a decision
made in isolation. Rather it was the result of a series of decisions driven by the need to update the
company’s entire compensation and employee evaluation system. If the lump-sum severance pay
plan served as the ‘cornerstone of the lifetime employment system’, then these new point systems
represent a first phase of DC plan introduction in Japan (Fujiwara 2002).
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Since Japanese companies appeared responding to the constraints imposed by the DC
pension law, a logical question is then: how did the current law come into existence and why?
Specifically, how did entrenched interest groups and other opponents of structural reforms
influence the political game, and under what conditions did they – or could they – control the
legislative process? The next section analyzes the inherent tension between the pressures for
change induced by corporate actors and global trends, and the resistance to change (i.e., policy or
institutional stickiness).

Toward Stro nger DC Legislation in Japan
“[The LDP, the bureaucracy, and the zaikai] may display surprising power at times
and unexpected weakness at others… The essential fact is that none of them can be
perceived as forming the apex of the Japanese power authority. ”
Karel van Wolferen (1989: 548)
As McCubbins and Noble (1995) explain, “Proposals, particularly new initiatives, must
pass through a whole series of veto gates, all of which are controlled by the LDP, so bureaucrats
have a strong incentive to tailor their proposals to appeal to the LDP” (530). Japanese corporations,
the broad circle of top business functionaries called the zaikai, and especially those who speak
through the Japanese Business Federations such as the Keidanren and the Japan Federation of
Employers' Associations (Nikkeiren),10 while not having a formal veto over policy processes, could
impose political costs on elected officials that ignore their preferences. Figure 5 portrays the
emergence of veto players on this piece of legislation.
Figure 5 here
With the DC legislation, two sets of actors appeared to independently initiate the
discussion: Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, and Japanese corporations. Sources within the
Ministry of Finance (MoF), the MoHLW, 11 and the Keidanren, concur that the Hashimoto cabinet
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became interested in DC legislation primarily as a way to prop up the stock market. Former
Chairman Kato of the Government Tax Investigative Committee wrote how the introduction oDC
plans became one way to quickly push forth a policy that moved away from the indirect financing
slant of a saving promotion policy and towards one that sought capital investment in the stock
market (Life Design Research Institute 2002). With a rise in stock prices, Japan’s non-performing
loan (NPL) problem could be lessened, helping banks unwind their cross-shareholdings and write
off their substandard assets. Meanwhile, Japanese corporations were seeking relief from a
prolonged recession and a dismal investment environment where pension underfunding realities
would soon be exposed by new accounting standards.
Conceiving Defined Contribution Plans. In March 1997, discussion and debate over corporate
pension reform began within the ruling political party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The
LDP dominated the political scene in Japan since the end of WWII with an uninterrupted majority
from 1955 to 1993. After 1993, the LDP regained its power the following year, and some
observers contend that it has been politics as usual in Japan ever since, stressing the continuity in
Japanese politics and arguing that recent political and economic reforms represent gradual rather
than fundamental change. 12 Others believe that the loss of single-party rule in 1993 and the
emergence of large-scale policy failures and scandals in the bureaucracy during the 1990s changed
the political balance. Toya (forthcoming) argues:
The gradualism widely observed until the mid-1990s does not hold in the case of
the Big Bang. These financial reforms are wider in scope and deeper in degree than
past financial reforms. … it did not evolve from the same informal bargaining
process among actors that has long characterized public policy making in postwar
Japan (2).

What Toya called ‘informal bargaining process,’ others may call the ‘old style’ of Japanese politics,
and it is what Aoki (1988) coined as ‘bureaupluralism’. Under bureaupluralism, public policies are
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produced from a consensus- making process organized by the bureaucracy but involving the
regulated industries and affiliated LDP politicians (known as zoku giin or “tribesmen”).
Bureaupluralism centers on such policy- making bodies as the deliberative councils in the
government and the LDP’s Policy Area Research Councils (PARC). Toya argued that the political
process that produced the Big Bang largely circumvented these bodies. The Big Bang initiative
first came to be known publicly when Prime Minister Hashimoto, taking many by surprise,
announced the initiative two weeks after the LDP victory in the Lower House elections of October
1996. DC legislation was also part of Prime Minister Hashimoto’s grandiose vision, but, while
receiving “Big Bang” attention from the same administration, went on to experience a lesser fate
and delayed policy outcome.
Since the proposed reform interfered with the jurisdiction of more than one ministry, each
of the related ministries – the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MoHW), the Ministry of Finance
(MoF), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and the Ministry of Labor (MoL)
– proceeded to form independent committees that March. Tsubono writes how, from the “birth” of
the corporate pension system in the 1960s, disparate oversight and regulatory control doomed the
system. Until 2001, companies were free to choose between TQPPs or EPFs, provided certain
requirements (which varied by plan type) were met. Oversight of the two types of plans, however,
fell under different jurisdictions with the MoF controlling TQPPs and the MoHW regulating EPFs.
The difference in jurisdictions transcended into a fundamentally different way of thinking about
these plans and resulted in systemic discrepancies concerning investment management rules and
other requirements. In particular, Tsubono (2002) pointed out that TQPPs, with their externally
accumulated assets, left employees with inadequate protection rights. Economic growth veiled
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these flaws so when the country hit a recession decades later, the imperfections of the system were
revealed; making apparent the need for more comprehensive systemic reform.
Impure Origins. Fujiwara (2003) attributed the movement toward DC law as the
government’s desire to bail out the ailing securities firms. Since the DC legislation would
enable financial institutions to diversify their businesses, it would provide Japanese securities
houses with much needed relief from non-performing loans (NPLs) and increased competition
in post-Big Bang Japan.
Many scholars have pointed to the financial industry as a key driver in Japanese politics.
Amyx (2004) painted a slightly darker picture to explain why the stock market was so important
for politicians, describing how insider trading and campaign finance distorted political preferences
toward higher stock prices. “Weaker” financial institutions, in particular, the securities firms and
the long-term credit and trust banks, successfully prevented past attempts by the MoF to launch
financial reforms (e.g. the 1979–82 banking reforms and the 1991–93 financial reforms) (Toya
forthcoming). In recent years, the NPL problem has become so central to Japan’s economic
paralysis that its overriding concern becomes understandable.
Tak Wakasugi (2003) of the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) recalled that
DC plans in Japan did not arise from a typical discussion of post-retirement security or the need to
protect beneficiaries, as might have beed expected based on the precedent set in other countries.
Rather, the idea arose as an issue linked to the recovery of the Japanese stock market. Just as stock
prices hovered at all-time lows in Japan during the mid-to-late 1990s, across the Pacific in the U.S.,
the stock market was seen booming. In the course of ongoing talks between the U.S. and Japan
during this timeframe, the introduction of 401(k) plans in Japan surfaced as a potential remedy
(Wakasugi 2003). The U.S. economy and stock market appeared to have been bolstered by the
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growth of DC plans. From Wakasugi’s perspective, the goal of stock market bolstering created a
tragic flaw for the eventual form of DC legislation in Japan since it overlooked the painstaking
detail required to enact such legislation. Here, we observe how a variant of gaiatsu was framed
under the guise of legitimate policy reform to achieve underlying political objectives. The U.S.Japan talks served as an opportunity for DC pension legislation in the face of insufficient policy
momentum. Absent intrinsic momentum on its own merits, DC legislation needed an alternative
stimulus to coordinate and drive the reform process.
Money Politics. While normally considered a politically influential body, the zaikai made
repeated pleas for the speedy introduction of DC plans, but these seemed to fall on deaf ears within
the government. This coincided with the Keidanren’s decision to discontinue political donations
after a wave of bureaucratic scandals in 1994, and this appeared to have undermined the DC
lobby’s political influence. Indeed, at the time of the merger between the Keidanren and the
Nikkeiren in May 2002, Chairman Okuda freely voiced concern over what he saw as a weakened
say by the Japanese Business Federations in key policy issues such as taxation and the social
welfare system (Kyodo 2002). By the end of 2002, the Keidanren announced a reinstated policy of
political donations.
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Cabinet Disruptions. The sudden death of Prime Minister Obuchi eroded the momentum in
the DC legislation (Urata 2001). In what appeared to be backroom factional deal- making, the
majority LDP appointed Yoshiro Mori as LDP president, which helped ensure his selection as
the next Prime Minister. Mori, a veteran of the LDP, but better known for his political dealcutting than policy- making skills, ascended to his new post only to face repeated bouts of
controversy and public disapproval.
Prime Minister Obuchi’s death led to the dissolution of the Diet before the DC bill could be
discussed. Perhaps without this unfortunate turn of events, the bill would have made it into law
that year. Prime Minister Mori did seek to maintain policy consistency by reappointing the entire
Obuchi cabinet. When the DC bill was re-submitted in the fall of 2000 during the extraordinary
session of the Diet, it again died allegedly because of the “shortage of discussion time” (Urata
2001). Yet, ultimately, when the bill was presented in June 2001, it passed both houses after eight
days of deliberation. Four years were reduced to a mere eight days.
LDP-Rengo Relations . Perhaps a better explanation can be found in the behind-the-scenes
cleavage between the LDP and Rengo. In 2000, Labor Minister Takamori made an historic
move by missing Rengo’s May Day rally (which Labor Ministers had attended since 1984),
signaling ill will between the government and the country’s largest union group (Kyodo 2000).
After Rengo diverted the passage of the DC bill during the extraordinary Diet session in late
1999, the government called off regular meetings between the prime minister and Rengo
officials, and the LDP refused to send its officials to Rengo-sponsored events.
The strained relations between the LDP and Rengo can be traced back to 1998 when Rengo
announced its support for the integration of opposition parties into the Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) (Kyodo 2001, November). Following the resignation of Prime Minister Hashimoto, Rengo

25

President Washio urged opposition parties to join the DPJ to build a non-LDP, anticommunist
political force (Kyodo 1998). Mori's administration followed the lead of its predecessor, Prime
Minister Obuchi, and refused to heed policy demands from Rengo due to the organization's support
for the main opposition party, the DPJ (Kyodo 2001, March).
Koizumi signaled a change of relations between the two groups when he attended Rengo’s
May Day rally on April 28, 2001, becoming the first prime minister to do so since Hashimoto in
1996 (Kyodo 2001, May). On June 12, 2001, members of Koizumi’s cabinet and leaders of labor
and business sectors gathered to exchange views prior to the planned issuance of Koizumi’s socalled ''big-boned'' reform blueprint later that month (Kyodo 2001, June). June 12, 2001 was also
the fortuitous day when the DC bill passed the Lower House. Coincidentally, the meeting that
occurred that day was one that had been suspended since November 1999, the last time the DC bill
had been presented to the Diet.
While the importance of labor’s sign-on may not have been all “smoke and mirrors”, the
underlying tones were unmistakably political. Once again, pure substantive concerns were set on
the back burner.
MOF vs. MOHW: the Great Saving Debate. One central argument in the pension debate
concerned the categorization of DC plans. MoF officials contended that these plans were merely
another form of saving, while MoHW officials fought for tax favorable treatment on par with other
pension schemes. To win its battle, the MoHW allegedly had to settle for the so-called “flaws” of
the eventual DC system, such as low contribution limits, no early withdrawal, and no employee
contributions (NPO Institute 2003). Subsequently, pension reform in 2001 and 2002 streamlined
the country’s existing corporate pension system all under the control of the MoHLW. Figure 6
shows a comparison of the before and after pictures of the two systems.
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Figure 6 here
“System” Fixation within the MoF. The MoF has long viewed the issue of corporate
pensions as just one part of the larger Japanese pension system, incorporating all private and
public schemes. A widely- held objective for the MoF has been the overall integration of
corporate pensions within this structure and the consistency of corporate pensions vis-à-vis the
public and other private pension (self-employed, government officials, etc.) components.
Wakasugi (2003) argued that the government (and particularly the MoF) never fully
appreciated the different ‘motivations’ for the three types of pensions (individual, corporate, and
public). In contrast to the individual’s primary objective of saving for retirement, Wakasugi (ibid.)
pointed out that corporations must focus on turning a profit and retaining good employees through
the provision of tax-advantaged benefits. Public pension plans differ since the public benefit
comprises a welfare payment that ensures a minimum standard of living and a social safety net.
One fundamental challenge in the public pension debate has been to improve premium collections,
which requires not only restoring confidence in the long-term viability of the system, but also
educating citizens of the necessity of this social provision – instilling what Wakasugi calls a “this
could happen to anyone” mentality.
Honne (real intention) vs. Tatemae (official stance)
The official reasons for passing DC legislation were stated as: (i) greater labor mobility
(whereby pension “portability” would be a necessary precursor); and (ii) the shifting of investment
risk burden from companies to emplo yees (justified by deteriorating financial conditions of
Japanese companies brought on by a prolonged structural recession). However, according to Koji
Yano of the MoF, both rationales contain flaws: greater labor mobility could not be achieved by
simply introducing DC legislation, since the income-related portion of the public pension was not
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yet transferable from EPFs; and the shifting of investment risk to employees was complicated by
labor negotiations and the perception that DC plans would be rejected by unions (2003). Instead,
Yano (2003) claimed the legislation grew out of a fear over the longevity crisis of the “worker's
property accumulation savings for pension” (or so-called nest-egg pension savings system) and,
what he considered, a blind deference to the “U.S. are doing it, too” mentality.
Under the long, protracted recession in Japan, corporate pension reform became a harsh
economic reality. Even the most financially stable and paternalistic companies have implemented
DC plans. Toyota is one example. Perhaps paternalism is not in-consistent with DC plan adoption,
but it is in fact consistent with it. Cerulli (2003) pointed to underfunding estimates approaching
¥12 trillion and predicted that “almost every Japanese EBP will report some form of funding
crisis” (27). According to a 2003 listing of the Japanese companies with the most severe
underfunding levels, the top (i.e., worst) company, Kanebo, held off-book underfunding at 190.03
times shareholder's equity (Nikkei Business 2003). In this light, DC plans provide a way to
mitigate pension risks and maintain plan viability. Keeping old, “sick” DB plans threaten the
overall viability of firms, and these stand to hurt Japanese employees more than a transition to a
DC plan would.
The preceding analysis of the developments surrounding the ratification of DC legislation
revealed how political instability and policy uncertainty constrained the legislation, which in turn
shaped the behavior and decision- making process at Japanese companies with respect to their
corporate pensions. With the number of ministries drawn into the pension debate and the
complexities surrounding the issue itself, ideological points were diffuse and this made
coordination and consensus- forming difficult.
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The presence of numerous and heterogeneous participants drove the legislative process
outside the traditional policy path in the case of the DC pension legislation. By appealing on the
basis of the stock market in 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto and the LDP managed to find a way
to get DC pensions onto the political agenda. Although the issue’s underlying complexity
undoubtedly played a role in the absolute length of time required to hammer out the legislation and
make necessary systemic reforms, the abrupt change in mome ntum in 2001 after Prime Minister
Koizumi visited Rengo’s May Day Rally reveals how political factors still reign supreme in this
process. Indeed, from the initial framing of DC pension legislation by Prime Minister Hashimoto
in 1997 to the behind-the-scenes smoothing of relations by Prime Minister Koizumi in 2001, the
importance of strong political leadership is noted in Japan. It appears to be prerequisite to
coordinate and carry out tough policy initiatives in the face of disparate agenda among ministries.

Implications for the Future
Perhaps the greatest challenge posed by the nationalistic nature of policymaking is that policy- makers often misunderstand the nature of the policy
frameworks of other countries. This lack of understanding leads them to
misinterpret the rationale of other countries' policies and incorrectly assess
their outcomes. Kenneth Pechter (2002)
Over the last few decades, the world’s leaders have learned that no nation is immune to
fiscal deficits, banking problems, and financial crises. Learning through the experiences of other
countries has been valuable for policymakers in developing an understanding about other
approaches, without having to implement them first for themselves. Indeed, a set of “best
practices” seems to have emerged to deal with every national “malaise” conceivable. However,
Pechter (2002) warns that policy-making should not be confused with management since: “…while
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business activities transcend borders, …policies are by nature directed at regions defined by
borders”.
Furthermore, each country’s unique circumstances dictate different policy responses. Yano
(2003) pointed to the different circumstances surrounding the introduction of DC legislation in
Japan compared to those in the U.S. In the U.S., 401(k) legislation provided a mechanism to
stimulate savings. Yano (2003) recalled that, ironically, this was approximately the time when
American researchers were in Japan studying the Japanese postal system to uncover the Japanese
saving success. Pechter (2002) echoed this sentiment when he wrote:
It was, however, not too long ago that Americans were looking to Japan for answers.
It was believed that the particular nature of the Japanese economic system gave
advantages to Japanese firms, and perhaps American policy-makers needed to
adjust American policies accordingly in order to reap similar benefits.
Many observers, including former Prime Minister Hashimoto, garnered hope from the U.S.
example and the spectacular growth of DC plans. However, even in the U.S., it took nearly two
decades before the total dollars in DC plans exceeded the amount in DB plans. In contrast, DC
legislation in Japan occurred at a time when the nation’s savings rate was being criticized abroad
for being too high and its imports too low. The Japanese government was at a point of trying to
initiate consumption-led economic recovery.
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A Cash Balance Solution? Introduced in Japan’s 2002 pension reform bill, Cash Balance
(CB) plans combine features of traditional defined benefit and defined contribution schemes,
and many Japanese corporate executives have expressed interest in these systems (Cerulli 2001,
June). So-called hybrid schemes have been controversial since their inception in the U.S.
However, in Japan, CB plans exemplify a compromise typical of Japan labor relations
historically since the risks inherent are shared by the employee and employer. The
“palatability” of this type of plan is in its bringing together features of the DC and DB models.
For managers, there is the built- in adjustment of interest rates to correspond to the current
interest environment. For employees, the flexibility and design aspects create portable benefits
while guaranteeing a certain level of benefits regardless of investment return. Furthermore, the
investment decision is deferred to management, which sits well with many Japanese employees
who have never owned a share of stock. The reduced burden and overall volatility on the
corporate balance sheet as well as an enhanced sense of fairness and equity for employees
creates a compromise that resounds well among employees and managers alike.
In a communiqué to employees regarding its October 2003 introduction of a CB plan,
Hitachi presented its rationale as two-fold. 13 First, the Company described how its pension fund
had suffered from three consecutive years of losses as a result of the low-interest environment and
depressed stock market in Japan. Second, Hitachi cited the pronounced impact of the pension plan
on management ever since the issuance of new accounting standards in Japan. Hitachi’s overriding
goal was said to be the creation of a sustainable and safe pension system. Hitachi illustrated how
the CB system was a true “win-win” for employees and the Company: since the CB plan
automatically adjusts to the current interest rate environment (every year according to a
predetermined benchmark14 ), it provided Hitachi with flexibility in terms of asset management and
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macroeconomic fluctuations. Mitigating interest and stock market movements would benefit both
parties since the reduced risk and volatility would enable management to concentrate on its core
business and ensure tomorrow’s workplace for employees. Employees would benefit from the
individual “virtual” accounts of the CB system, which offer similar incentives and appearances as
DC individual accounts, but with the extra protection built into the CB structure. The downside to
employees is mitigated since the CB plan would guarantee a range of returns corresponding to the
current investing environment.
The current U.S. controversy surrounding CB plans should not threaten the continued
interest in and the proliferation of these plans in Japan. As Kenji Sekine of Towers Perrin
remarked, “cash balance plans were built differently in Japan and are not subject to the same
conversion ambiguity as they were in the U.S.”15 Olivia Mitchell from the Wharton School noted:
The main reason that CB plans are in the hot seat (in the US) is that a judge has
deemed them in violation of the age discrimination act. Some of the CB plans
appear to accrue benefits at a lower rate for older workers than for younger workers.
Whether this will raise a ruckus in Japan seems unlikely to me since there,
mandatory retirement is legal, and the government doesn't seem too concerned
about age discrimination. 16
Cash balance plans appear to be a good “fit” for Japanese companies, combining the best
features of defined contribution and defined benefit plans, and also suiting Japanese unionmanagement relations. Further reform and rule clarification in these plans as plans proliferate is
likely to continue.

Conclusions
Japan’s DC pension legislation clearly disappointed many corporate actors. Their
subsequent hesitance in adopting DC plans did not reflect paternalism, but the fact that they faced
an unsatisfactory option. Their criticism of the current structure seems to have reached the
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MoHLW, where recent lobbying efforts have called for increased contribution limits (N ikkei
Shimbun 2003). The LDP is apt to comply since the party’s tax commission is looking for ways to
offset a proposed reduction in public pension benefits. One solution lies in more expansive
corporate pensions made attractive through an increase in the upper limit on nontaxable
contributions.
In the run-up to the general election on November 9, 2003, major political parties cited
public pension reform as a top campaign promise in their “manifesto” agenda. This represented a
significant divergence from elections past when pension issues were considered taboo for political
debate before an election due to their unpalatable nature among older constituents. Opposition
forces within the DPJ have put the LDP on the defensive. Nevertheless, the challenge to the
leadership of Japan is undeniable due to the controversial nature of the reforms and the following
irony, as noted by Tiberghien (2002):
The significance of these structural reforms is considerable because they aim at
undoing the very features of the Japanese political economy that were once
recognized as the foundations of the three-decade long economic miracle. These
features include keiretsu links between manufacturers and suppliers, crossshareholding ties, the lifetime employment system, the main bank system, and a
quasi state-guarantee against bankruptcy (Chapter 5: 4).
On the one hand, it appears that pension issues are now reaching a higher level of debate in
Japan before being vetoed (rather than failing to pass through the hoops at lower stages). On the
other hand, a simple change in the arrangement of actors will not alone solve the problem of policy
coordination in Japan; also at issue is the ongoing and vigorous debate about what the best route
for Japan might be in the pension arena. So while the flux of the political climate provides some
optimism for more positive change, continuing uncertainty over policy direction is likely to impede
the introduction of necessary changes in legislation. Pension reform is a complex issue and in
Japan in particular, driven by a changing power dynamic in the policy sector. Understanding of
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these nuances may alert international observers as to which actors bear watching, to predict when
real and meaningful change will emerge.
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Endnotes
1

This figure includes both Employees Pension Funds (EPFs) and Tax-Qualified Pension Plans
(TQPPs).

2

The U.S. is ranked 28th and 30th for males and females, respectively.

3

Note: the exchange rate was approximately $1 = ¥112 in September 2003.

4

Formerly the Ministry of Health and Welfare.

5

The 5-3-3-2 regulation stipulated the investment allocation of pension plans as follows: 50% or
more in a principal-guaranteed asset, 30% or less in domestic stocks, 30% or less asset in foreign
currency, and 20% or less in fixed property.

6

Based on personal discussions at Keidanren, August 12-13, 2003.

7

U.S. Dollar figures assume an exchange rate of approximately $1 = ¥106.

8

A special corporate tax of 1.173% is assessed on asset balances, but the Government has suspended
this tax since 1998, rolling it back every two years. Currently, it is suspended until fiscal 2005.

9

Based on personal interview, July 2, 2003.

10

In May 2002, the Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations) and Nikkeiren (Japan
Federation of Employers' Associations) combined to form the Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business
Federation).

11

In 2001, the Health and Welfare Ministry (MoHW) and the Labor Ministry (MoL) were combined
into the Health, Labor, and Welfare Ministry (MoHLW).

12

For example, see Curtis (2002) and Vogel (1994).

13

June 13, 2003 (courtesy of Hiroshi Maruta).

14

Hitachi uses the 10-year Japanese Government Bond (JGB) as its benchmark.

15

Based on personal discussions, August 4, 2003.
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16

Based on personal discussions, August 9, 2003.

17

The number of participants and reserves are measured as of March 2002; taken from MoHLW and
drawn by Institute of Pension Research, Nikko Financial Intelligence, Inc.

18

From “No Gains without Reforms III,” Annual Report on the Japanese Economy and Public
Finance. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, October 2003.

19

From “No Gains without Reforms III,” Annual Report on the Japanese Economy and Public
Finance. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, October 2003. Note: Elderly is characterized as
over 60 years old.

20

The 2002 figure is as of October 24, 2002, taken from Institute of Pension Research, Nikko
Financial Intelligence, Inc./Pension Fund Association’s Annual Report on of Employees’ Pension
Funds.

